Duquesne Law Review
Volume 4

Number 3

Article 12

1965

Pennsylvania Practice and Procedure - Principal Office Rule
Charles Scarlata

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons

Recommended Citation
Charles Scarlata, Pennsylvania Practice and Procedure - Principal Office Rule, 4 Duq. L. Rev. 483 (1965).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol4/iss3/12

This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

1965-19661

RECENT DECISIONS

self-employed claimant whose disability limits his working capacity to the
supervision of others, the issue of "total disability" is a question of fact for
the jury. It is no longer a matter of law that the ability to perform supervisory work removes a self-employed claimant from the class of the
"totally disabled."
Bryan Campbell

PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE-Principal Office Rule-The

Pennsylvania Supreme Court has amended this rule to allow attorneys to
practice in all counties.
In Re: Amendment to Rule 14 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania,419 Pa. (5),- A.2d- (1965).
Last November, in response to a petition filed by the Philadelphia Bar
Association, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted a resolution amending Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.' This amendment, although apparently
definitive, has not entirely resolved the controversy. The crux of the
uncertainty which remains is the extent of elimination of the Principal
Office Rule2 and its concomitant requirement that an "out of county"
attorney retain a local associate before practicing in a county other than
the one in which he maintains his principal office. Briefly stated, the Principal Office Rule allows a state certified attorney to practice only in the
county in which he maintains his principal office. By virtue of this Rule, a
nonresident attorney can maintain suit in another county only if he retains
a local associate, i.e., an attorney who does maintain his principal office
in that county.
Historically, the Principal Office Rule began with the case of Hoopes v.
Bradshaw.' There the supreme court was faced with interpreting the Act
of May 8, 1909, P.L. 475, which stated that:
1. PA. SuP. CT. R. 14 (1966). Although adopted in 1965, the amended Rule first
appeared in the 1966 Supreme Court Rules.
2. The pertinent section of this rules reads as follows:
Admission to the bar of this Court shall entitle anyone so admitted to
admission to the bar of any other court of this Commonwealth, subject however,
to the right of the County Board of the county in which his application for
admission to the bar is filed to pass upon the applicant's fitness and general
qualifications (other than scholastic), notwithstanding any prior certification to
such effect by the County Board of the county of his original registration, and
subject, further, to the applicant's filing with the County Board, if local rules so
require, his written promise to establish and maintain his principal office and place
of law practice in the county to whose bar he seeks admission. PA. SUrP. CT. R. 14
(1965).
3. 231 Pa. 485, 80 At. 1098 (1911).
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admission to practice as an attorney at law in every other

court of the Commonwealth shall of itself, without more, operate
as an admission of such attorney as an attorney at law in every
other court of the Commonwealth, without any further action by
such other courts or by such attorney.4
Hoopes, a member of the Allegheny County Bar, claimed that this Act
entitled him to practice before the bar of Beaver County. The Court of
Common Pleas of Beaver County denied his admission on the grounds that
this Act was an unconstitutional usurpation of judicial power by the legislature. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the result, but rejected
the rationale of unconstitutionality. In so doing, the court ruled that
even though the Act was constitutional, it did not prohibit local courts from
establishing their own requirements for admission. In examining the effect
of the Act upon the service of notices and papers upon nonresident attorneys, the court reasoned that an influx of out-of-county attorneys might
unreasonably inconvenience resident practitioners and unduly clog court
dockets. Thus, the court expressly approved the Principal Office Rule by
holding it to be within the ambit of the powers of the local courts.'
In 1923, the General Assembly amended the Act of 1909.' Although
this amendment made no mention of the maintenance of a principal office
7
as a prerequisite to county practice, the supreme court in Olmsted's Case
again expressly approved this Rule. The rationale of this decision was that
the Rule operated to aid the effective operation of the courts.
Stewart v. Bechtel8 was the next pertinent case decided. The trend
which Stewart emphasized probably led to the adoption of Rule 12 3x2 later to become Rule 14. In this case, the supreme court construed the
Act of 1923 as permitting a county to establish its own standards of admission. Rule 12 Y2, adopted by the court in 1949, was an explicit acceptance of the Principal Office Rule. Finally, in the Christy Case' the United
4. Act of 1909, May 8, P. L. 475, quoted in Hoopes v. Bradshaw, id. at 487, 80 At.
at 1099.
5. Id. at 491, 80 At. at 1100.
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1605 (1923):
Admission now had or that may hereafter be had to practice as an attorney-at-law
in the Supreme Court of this Commonwealth shall, upon the approval of the local
examining board, qualify such attorney for admission to practice as an attorneyat-law in every other court of this Commonwealth, and upon such approval shall
operate as an admission of such attorney in any other court of this Commonwealth
upon his filing, in the office of the prothonotary or clerk of said court, a certificate
of admission in the Supreme Court and a certificate of approval from the local
examining board and the payment to such prothonotary or clerk of a fee of one
dollar.
7. 292 Pa. 96, 140 At. 634 (1928).
8. 360 Pa. 123, 61 A.2d 514 (1948).
9. 362 Pa. 347, 67 A.2d 85 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 869 (1949).
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States Supreme Court, by denying certiorari, failed to disturb a Pennsylvania Supreme Court finding of constitutionality. With the Principal
Office Rule thus intact, a Pennsylvania attorney could be denied the
right to practice in any county other than that in which he maintained
his principal office.
Various arguments have been advanced both for and against the Principal Office Rule. Most of the arguments against the Rule are based upon
its impracticality and uselessness. The advocates of this position argue
that the provincialism inherent in the Principal Office Rule paints a dull
picture of Pennsylvania as a progressive state and thus hinders its growth
and expansion. It has been further argued that the original justification
for the rule no longer exists. In earlier times, the burdens of travel and
communication militated in favor of the Rule. Today, with the increased
use of air transportation and with various turnpikes and expressways
available, distance is no longer an obstacle. A significant argument against
the Rule is that it operates contrary to the best interests of the client;
that is, since an out-of-county attorney must retain a local associate and
this associate is also entitled to a fee, the costs to the client increase. The
final argument of those who oppose the Rule is that it violates the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
On the other hand, proponents of the Principal Office Rule deny all
these arguments and contend that in Pennsylvania a countywide practice
is the most advantageous and practical type available. They reason that
by the maintenance of a geographically restricted practice the courts are
better able to control their dockets, and county bars are better qualified to
govern disciplinary matters and to control requirements for admission.
Furthermore, it is argued that since most counties have procedural
peculiarities with which nonresident attorneys would not be familiar, the
Rule requiring local associates lends itself to better service to a client.
Since the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided to amend Rule 14, it
apparently accepted the arguments of the adversaries of the old Rule. The
only problem now remaining is the interpretation of Rule 14 as amended:
Admission to the Bar of this court shall entitle such attorneys
to admission to the bar of and to practice in all courts of this
Commonwealth.
No person shall be admitted to practice before any court of
this Commonwealth unless he has received a certificate from the
State Board of Law Examiners recommending his admission to
the bar of this Court.
Any and all local rules for admission to the respective bars of
the courts of the several counties of this Commonwealth which
require an office, or a partner, or associate, or assistant within
that county, or which prescribes length of residence in that
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county as a prerequisite to admission to the local bar, or which
limit the number of admissions upon a quota basis, or prescribe
other requirements, are hereby superseded.'
There are four possible ways in which county bars may interpret this
Rule. The first is to take a literal view; that is, to interpret the Rule strictly.
Paragraph 1 of Rule 14 grants to all attorneys admitted to the state bar
the privilege of practicing before any county bar. This paragraph also
precludes denying admission to a state certified attorney. Therefore, under
this view a county bar might just as well grant automatic admission to all
attorneys certified by the state. A more strict interpretation might construe
this paragraph as granting automatic admission to county bars upon acceptance in the state bar.
The second alternative is not to object to or attempt to prohibit nonresident attorneys from practicing within the county, but to require them
first to seek admission to the local county bar. While paragraph 1 of this
rule entitles nonresident attorneys to practice in and be admitted to the
bars of the several counties, it in no way implies that this admission should
be granted without these nonresident attorneys meeting the same requirements that are necessary for resident attorneys. This would encompass
registration, the payment of a registration fee, and, in some counties, a
personal interview. Although these requirements are not difficult to comply
with, obtaining admission may be overly troublesome. For example, the
attorney who will handle only a small number of cases within a given
county may feel that the existing registration procedures are too onerous
because of time and financial requirements. Thus, he would not seek admission to the county bar, and, although literally entitled to practice in
that county, as a practical matter he would not.
The third way in which to construe this Rule would be to require non.
resident attorneys to meet certain criteria. Even though paragraph 3 of
Rule 14 prescribes certain requirements, it does not eliminate all others.
If a requirement were made that bore a reasonable relationship to the
effectiveness of the judicial process (such as proof by a nonresident attorney of his availability, or knowledge of the idiosyncrasies of the
procedure of a particular county), it would probably pass judicial
scrutiny under this rule.
Alternative four consists of a combination of methods two and three.
This interpretation first requires admission to the county bar. In addition, it would make the requirements for admission more stringent. However, these requirements would necessarily have to be applicable both to
resident and nonresident attorneys. An example of this approach would
be to require an attorney seeking admission to a county bar to show that
10. PA. SuP. CT. R. 14 (1966).
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he can be in court, on any given day; with only two hours notice. Most
nonresident attorneys would not be able to comply with these requirements
and would be denied admission to the county bar, and would thereby be
prevented from practicing in the county courts. Naturally, as with method
three above, the requirements must bear some reasonable relationship to
effective judicial administration.
In summary, it should be noted that at the time of this writing there has
been no judicial decision or interpretation of Rule 14. It is interesting to
note, however, that in a situation arising in Allegheny County (which
was a strong proponent of the amendment), President Judge Henry
Ellenbogen upheld the Prothonotary's refusal to allow a Washington
County attorney to file a suit in Allegheny County. In a statement to the
press, Judge Ellenbogen said that "a large amount of problems must be
solved before the amendment can be implemented. He said he has turned
the matter over to a committee of the Board of Judges and to the Allegheny County Bar Association for study."'1
In the absence of a supreme court interpretation, if every county takes
this approach in implementing Rule 14, it is quite possible that we will be
faced with sixty-seven different interpretations and ultimately with more
confusion than existed before the amendment was passed.
Charles Scarlata
11. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Dec. 13, 1965, p. 27, col. 4.

